Asian Current

Pan-Asianism is one of the potentially explosive ideas that have contributed to Japan’s drive for expansion. It has become increasingly popular, especially among high military officers, both active and retired. Typical of the spirit of Japanese Pan-Asianism is an article by the publicist Rin Kaito, who, after recalling the religions, arts, and sciences which originated in Asia and repudiating the Occidental assumption of superiority to Orientals, ends on the following note:

For over a century and a half the Asiatics have been pressed down by the Whites and subjected to Western tyranny. But Japan, after defeating Russia, has aroused the sleeping Asiatics to shake off the Western tyranny and torture.

It is significant that Major General Kenji Doihara, who had the reputation of being one of Japan’s most astute military diplomats and experts on the mainland of Asia/ is an avowed believer in Pan-Asianism. “The doctrine of ‘Asia for the Asiatics,’” Doihara wrote in an issue of Dai Asia Shugi, a magazine devoted to expounding Pan-Asian ideas, “is based on the supreme principle that Asia must be safeguarded and maintained by Asiatics.”

In other words, the Occidental should go, from China first of all, then from the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, India, and other parts of Asia which should be “safeguarded and maintained by Asiatics.” Under present conditions “Asia for the Asiatics” in practice would be synonymous with “Japan over Asia.” The Japanese superiority over other Oriental peoples in such factors of national strength as military and naval power, general literacy, industrial development, and military organization is so great that there would be almost no limit to Japanese expectations of supremacy in Asia if the influence of the West were withdrawn.

I recently discussed the ideals of the Pan-Asian movement with General I wane Matsui, former commander of the Japanese garrison in Formosa and a leading figure in the Dai Asia Kyokai (Great Asia Association) of Japan. Spare in build and alert in bearing, General Matsui, like many other Japanese high officers, gave the impression of keeping himself in an excellent state of physical fitness through rigorous exercise and simple living. He described as one of the ideals of his organization “an Asiatic League of Nations, based on the slogan (Asia for the Asiatics,’” and declared that Pan-Asianism had won followers in China, India, French Indo-China, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. He gave me with approval a pamphlet in the English language entitled Asiatic Asia: What Does It Mean? By Professor Takeyo Nakatani, secretary of the association. The idea of Japanese hegemony in the Pan-Asian order was clearly put forward by Professor Nakatani in the following terms:

To bring order and reconstruction to the present chaotic condition of Asia is a duty that rests mostly on the shoulders of Japan… She has been asked to put to work all her forces, cultural, political, economic, and, if need be, military, in order to bring about unity and wholesale reconstruction in Asia.

The appeal of the Pan-Asian idea outside of Japan does not seem to be very wide or very great. Now and then a roving nationalist revolutionary from India or the Philippines may find shelter in Japan. But there is no evidence that Oriental nationalists, however much they may dislike British, French, or Dutch rule, would care to substitute Japanese. Japan’s aggressive policy toward China has certainly not been calculated to win support for plans of cooperating on a Pan-Asian or any other basis.

But while Pan-Asianism is a negligible force outside of Japan, the propulsive force of the idea in Japan should not be underrated. General Matsui is not the only Japanese military leader who cherishes an almost mystical faith in Japan’s mission as the driving force in an “Asia for the Asiatics” movement. If the Japanese Empire is to expand further, Pan-Asianism, to a certain type of Japanese mind, may become a slogan as inspiring as Kipling’s phrase about the “white man’s burden” was to the believer in the blessings of British imperial rule.

So behind the Japanese sweep toward empire one finds a whole complex of impelling forces. Some of these stem from Japan’s romantic feudal past, with its cult of the sword; others are derived rather from the more prosaic counting house considerations of the present.

The average Japanese does not possess a speculative mind.

But those who try to draw lessons from their country’s history must sometimes regret the two and a half centuries of self-imposed seclusion from which Japan emerged into the modern world with the Meiji Restoration of 1868. For while Japan was leading its static, shut-in life under the Tokugawa Shogunate, the rich colonial prizes were being staked out. Japan was handicapped in the race for colonial spoils by her super isolation, much as Germany and Italy were handicapped by the late achievement of national unity.

Two centuries ago, before Russia, Great Britain, France, and other foreign powers had struck firm roots in the Far East, it would have been far simpler and easier for Japan to carve out a vast Asiatic empire than it is at the present time. To-day Japanese pressure evokes counter-pressure. As a direct result of Japan’s drive for expansion, East Asia is arming on a scale which recalls the military establishments of its great mediaeval conquerors, Genghis Khan and Kublai Khan.

The more spectacular armament race in Europe should not obscure the fact that the Far East is also arming to the limit of its resources. From Vladivostok, Russia’s main window on the Pacific, to Singapore, at the tip of the Malay Peninsula, every country, with variations dictated by size, population, and resources, is investing an ever-larger share of its income in troops and ships and airplanes and cannon.

Take a brief imaginary tour of the Far East from north to south. The long Soviet-Manchoukuo frontier, slightly defended a few years ago, now bristles on the Russian side with forts and blockhouses, gas- and bomb-proof hangars for a fleet of several hundred airplanes, cantonments and storehouses for an army that is generally estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000 men. Vladivostok, from which Japanese residents are being crowded out by none too gentle methods, is a large garrison town and submarine base.

On the other side of the frontier the Japanese army of occupation in Manchoukuo, while inferior to the Soviet forces in Siberia as regards size and equipment, is much the largest force that Japan has ever maintained on the Asiatic continent in time of peace. And Japan itself is passing through one political and economic crisis after another because of the effort to increase armaments at a pace which affects adversely both the financial stability of the country and the living standards of the people.

China in 1936 was America’s best customer in the field of airplanes and aeronautical equipment. Chinese purchases amounted to $6,872,000, as against $2,293,000 in 1935. And military airplanes represent only one part of China’s preparedness programme, which lays heavy burdens on the country’s chronically straitened finances.

The Commonwealth Government of the Philippines has launched a universal-service army scheme which will train 400,000 men by the time full independence is realized in 1946. The annual military appropriation of 16,000,000 pesos ($8,000,000) is a substantial item in the limited Philippine budget, but is small in relation to the country’s defense needs. It must be increased if the Philippine Army is to possess adequate air and naval auxiliary units.

Siam is spending money abroad for arms so fast that its British financial adviser has felt obliged to sound a gentle note of warning that financial equilibrium is under a strain as a consequence of the large outlay of foreign currency. Military appropriations have increased in the Dutch East Indies and in French Indo-China.

In the Dutch East Indies, where apprehension in regard to Japan’s ultimate acquisitive designs, whether justified or unjustified, is very pronounced, a hundred and fifty fighting planes are held in readiness at the air base near Surabaya. Great Britain has been holding large-scale maneuvers, with units drawn from places as far apart as Hong Kong and Iraq, to test the effectiveness of the great naval and air base at Singapore.

In the Far East, as in Europe, the arms-limitation hopes of what seem in retrospect the peaceful ‘twenties have been thoroughly blighted. At the moment a precarious equilibrium has been attained. Japan’s forward policy on the continent of Asia has provoked so much counter-arming that the Island Empire can scarcely take new aggressive steps without running the risk of provoking serious conflict. Whether this uneasy truce may in time be transformed into something more positively pacific, or whether it will break down altogether, depends in no small degree on how the issue of war and peace will be settled in Europe.

Japan’s sweep toward empire has by no means been purely military and territorial in character. Goods with the “Made in Japan” label have won their victories and made their enemies, just as the Japanese soldiers on the battlefields of Manchuria and Jehol. Japan’s advance to a commanding position on the Asiatic continent may be graphically represented by three arrows, pointing in different directions. The first points north, to Manchoukuo and the troubled frontier with Russia. The second points west, to China, where the destiny of Japan as an imperial power may well be settled. The third points south, to the rich tropical lands where Japan’s activities have thus far been purely commercial in character.

Professor Teijiro Uyeda, one of Japan’s leading economists and a specialist on the population question, is convinced that Japan, like other countries which have gone through the process of industrialization and urbanization, will experience a gradual tapering off of the present sharp rate of increase in the number of its inhabitants. He points out that the birth rate has shown a tendency to decline (from 36.2 in 1920 to 31.6 in 1935) and foresees that in time this downward curve will be more significant than the simultaneous decline in the death rate. However, Professor Uyeda anticipates that for some time there will be no diminution in the annual number of young Japanese who come of working age, since a large child population has already been born. So the pressure of a rapidly growing population seems bound to influence Japan’s development for the next two decades at least.

The extremely strong position of the fighting services in the Japanese constitutional scheme of things has also unmistakably promoted the vigorous forward move on the Asiatic continent. Soldiers are sometimes willing to take risks of international antagonism from which diplomats might shrink. And the army has exerted a powerful influence on the shaping of foreign policy during the last six years.

Japanese army and navy officers have never taken kindly to the idea that the Diet should control the activities of their services. Japan perhaps came nearest to civilian control over the fighting services in 1930 when Premier Hamaguchi, an unusually forceful personality for a Japanese civilian, pushed through the ratification of the London Naval Treaty (This was concluded as a supplement to the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.) against the recommendations of some high naval officers.

But this proved a Pyrrhic victory. Hamaguchi was shot by an enthusiastic nationalist and died of his wound. The agitation against the London Treaty hardened navy sentiment against any new ratio agreement which would bind Japan to maintain a position of inferiority to America and Great Britain in naval strength. There were echoes of the London Naval Treaty and of the supposed “usurpation of the imperial prerogative” by a civilian Premier in every nationalist terrorist enterprise of succeeding years, including the spectacular rebellion of February 26, 1936.

The army also reacted sensitively to the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty. The War Minister, General Jiro Minami, openly encouraged army officers to take part in political activity when he said, in the course of an address before divisional commanders of the army, in August 1931:

“Some people hastily advocate limitation of armaments, and engage in propaganda unfavorable to the nation and the army, while others take advantage of the present psychology of the people with a view to reducing the army for domestic reasons. I hope you will cooperate with the War Ministry authorities in correcting such mistakes.”

If one looks back to the files of the Japanese press on the eve of the Mukden affair, he finds no lack of indication that the army was anticipating some striking developments in Manchuria. So Assai, a leading Tokyo newspaper, on September 9, 1 931, quoted Colonel (later General) Ken Ji Doihara, a very active officer in the Japanese forces stationed in Manchuria, as stating that “there was no telling what might happen in Manchuria.” The Tokyo press of September 15 reported an important conference in which War Minister Minami and several other high military officials participated. According to the press it was decided to seek satisfaction by force for the murder of Captain Nakamura, a Japanese officer who had been killed while on a trip in the interior of China, if diplomacy failed to obtain the same result by peaceful means.

It would be oversimplification to suggest that the army “staged” the seizure of Manchuria simply as a means of restoring its shaken prestige at home and driving liberalism and pacifism into the background. Other considerations were involved: the many unsettled economic disputes with the Chinese authorities; the disposition of Chang Hsuehliang, ruler of Manchuria, to establish closer relations with the nationalist regime in China; the desire to push back the reviving Russian influence in the Far East. But that the army took full advantage of the strengthened position which it acquired as a result of the outbreak of hostilities in Manchuria is unmistakable. As a Japanese scholar writes:

The actual authority for directing the nation’s foreign policy was gradually shifting from Kasumigaseki (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Miyakezaka (the Ministry of War) by the middle of August, 1931, and this tendency toward dual diplomacy became more pronounced during the first phase of the League procedure in September. Towards the beginning of October, however, even this last vestige of dual diplomacy appeared to be waning, with the Miyakezaka in firm control of the government, directing the nation’s policy toward the League as well as the Manchurian developments.

The requirement that the posts of War and Navy Minister may be held only by a general and an admiral in active service makes it possible for either the army or the navy to frustrate the formation of any cabinet of which they disapprove. So strong is the corporate spirit in the higher ranks of the army and navy that no officer would accept an appointment in a cabinet against the advice of his colleagues.

Japan’s sweep toward empire cannot be explained merely in terms of population pressure, desire for economic selfsufficiency, and the strong predominance of military and naval leaders in the councils of the empire. There are psychological elements in the Japanese character, in the Japanese cast of thought that fit in readily with a programme of aggrandizement and expansion. Intense patriotism, red-hot nationalism, is deeply implanted in the Japanese masses. The divine origin that is attributed to the Emperor imparts an element of religious sanction to the most exalted conceptions of Japan’s destiny. Take, for example, the grandiose conception of Japan’s national mission (nothing less than world pacification), as set forth in Professor Chikao Fujisawa’s book, Japanese and Oriental Political Philosophy:

The [Japanese] Emperor as the Sage-King would think it his sacred duty to love and protect not only the people of this land, but also those alien peoples who are suffering from misgovernment and privations. It must be recalled that the Sage-King is answerable in person for the pacification of the entire Under-Heaven, which is the ancient name for the whole world: consequently his moral and political influence ought to make itself strongly felt through the length and breadth of the earth. Should any unlawful elements dare to obstruct in one way or another the noble activities of the Sage-King, he would be permitted to appeal to force; but this may be justified only when he acts strictly on behalf of Heaven… This firm belief in our holy state mission moved Japan to assist Mr. Henry Pu Yi to found the new state of Manchoukuo, which will faithfully follow the way of the SageKing… Nippon’s national flag is an ensign of “red heart,” or fiery sincerity. It alludes to the heavenly mission of Japan to tranquillize the whole world.

The ease with which “the will of heaven” may be invoked to justify Japan’s military and naval aspirations is reflected in the following excerpt from a pamphlet which was issued in the summer of 1935 by the Japanese Navy Ministry:

In view of Japan’s geographical position the powers should leave the maintenance of peace in the Orient in the hands of Japan, which is now powerful enough to perform this duty. If the other powers fail to recognize the mission of Japan they may well be said to disobey the will of Heaven.

A train journey or a cross-country walking trip gives abundant visual evidence that the rural districts of Japan are crowded to the saturation point. Every available inch of land is cultivated; the carefully terraced, irrigated rice fields on the steep hillsides are a monument of patient toil and ingenuity. Between 1920 and 1930, when the whole population increased by about eight and a half millions, the number of persons employed in agriculture slightly declined.

Three possible peaceful remedies for Japan’s population problem are birth control, emigration, and industrialization. Birth control is frowned on by the authorities and runs counter to the strong impulse among the Japanese and other Oriental peoples to conceive many male children in order to ensure the continuity of the family line. Its practice is spreading among the more Westernized and sophisticated Japanese of the larger towns, but it is not yet appreciably slowing up the number of births. The middle-class family with five or six children is far more frequently found in Japan than in America or Great Britain.

There is still room for settlers in the northern parts of the Island Empire, in Hokkaido and in Southern Sakhalin. But the absorption capacity of both these regions, so far as I could learn during a recent visit, is definitely limited. Hokkaido has reached its present population of about 3,000,000 over a period of sixty years. There is a twenty-year plan for the development of Hokkaido which calls for the doubling of this figure by 1956.

But experienced residents of Hokkaido, both Japanese and foreigners, expressed doubt whether this plan could be realized. The best land is already settled; Japanese coming from warmer parts of the empire find the climate of Hokkaido too cold and foggy; the percentage of assisted colonists who fail to stick out the rigors of pioneering in this northern island is already fairly high. The prospects in Sakhalin are still less promising. The Japanese part of this island now reckons about 336,000 inhabitants. It is questionable whether room can be found for more than 200,000 new settlers – a mere drop in the stream of population increase.

Manchoukuo is the uncertain element in Japanese emigration policy. The army dreams of solving two problems, relieving agrarian congestion in Japan and building up a solid human wall against the Russian threat, by settling millions of sturdy Japanese peasants in the northern provinces of Manchoukuo, where there is a considerable amount of untenanted land. But so far this is only a dream. Only a handful of Japanese agriculturists have settled in Manchoukuo, although there has been an influx of merchants, traders, artisans, employees, and other urban dwellers into the new state. It remains to be seen whether such unfavorable factors as a severely cold climate, chronic banditism, the lower living standards of the native Manchurian peasants with whom the Japanese settlers must compete, can be overcome or sufficiently alleviated to make possible a large-scale emigration movement.

The only other foreign country to which Japanese emigrants have been going or could go in any considerable number is Brazil. About 128,000 Japanese have settled there, the record figure of migration for any single year being 12,000. But a large immigration of Japanese settlers, like an inflow of Japanese goods, is apt to provoke restrictive measures. Japanese emigration to Brazil has now been placed on a quota basis, which seems likely to reduce it to small dimensions.

So emigration, like birth control, seems likely to make only a minor contribution to the solution of Japan’s population problem. There remains industrialization; and here Japan has made remarkable strides during the last few years, as will be shown in detail in later chapters.

There are two considerations, however, which prevent industrialization from serving as a panacea, smoothly and automatically absorbing the steady increment of the working population. In the first place, machines have been replacing men and women very perceptibly in the larger and better equipped Japanese factories. More output with fewer workers has been especially characteristic of the textile industry, which gives more employment than any other form of factory production.

Moreover, Japan’s striking progress in export trade has encountered more and more barriers in the form of tariffs, quotas, and self-limitation agreements, concluded by Japanese businessmen as a means of forestalling these restrictions. Industry, trade, and the traditional family system have thus far absorbed, after a fashion, Japan’s annual contingent of new mouths to be fed. Japan is a nation of shopkeepers; a stroll through the streets of Tokyo, Osaka, or any Japanese provincial town reveals an amazing number of people who depend for their living on the proceeds of some very small store. The family system is Japan’s substitute for the dole; it is taken for granted that the successful and prosperous members of a family will look after their less capable or less fortunate relatives.

But the sense of strain and tension is never absent. With its unusual combination of an Oriental birth rate and an Occidental death rate, Japan sees itself confronted with the alternative of expanding or exploding. So there is a direct line of connection between the numerous slant-eyed children whom one finds in every Tokyo side street, playing battledore and shuttlecock, or flying kites, or playing soldiers with sticks for guns and swords, and the patrols of real Japanese soldiers who are hunting down guerrilla “bandits” in Manchoukuo or parading along the Bund of Shanghai. Japan sees in empire a possible way out of its population impasse.

I have discussed at some length Japan’s pressure of population, not only because, along with the closely related problem of poverty in essential raw materials, it is a main driving force in the sweep toward expansion, but also because it affects very intimately many other phases of Japanese life. Many peculiar features of industry and agriculture are attributable in large measure to the fact that there are more people in Japan than the country can comfortably support. Population pressure is a dynamic and explosive force internally as well as externally. It feeds the ferment of dissatisfaction that occasionally finds expression in spectacular plots and assassinations.

There is a school of thought, persuasively represented in England by Sir Norman Angell, among others, which contends that the national ownership of raw materials is unimportant and that the alleged grievances of the so-called (’have-not” powers are largely, if not entirely, spurious. Members of this school of economic thinking declare that the expense of conquering and administering colonies is out of all proportion to the trade, investment, and migration benefits which accrue from colonial imperialism. Since producers of essential raw materials are only too eager to find buyers, there is nothing, according to this line of argument, to prevent a nation which is poor in raw materials from buying what it needs in the cheapest market and building up its industries on imported raw materials.

There is indubitable weight in these arguments. The horse of poverty in raw materials has been ridden too hard. Yet it is significant that it is usually economists and publicists who are citizens of states which are richest in colonies who are most eager to demonstrate the unimportance of colonial possessions. Spokesmen for the “have-not” peoples have often been guilty of exaggeration in their claims. But in a world of rampant economic nationalism and protectionism the proletarian nation is at a disadvantage compared with its well-to-do brother.

Two concrete illustrations will help to show how Japan is handicapped in the economic race with countries which, like Great Britain and France, possess large colonial empires, or which, like America and the Soviet Union, are notably rich in internal resources.

Japan needs rubber. The natives of Malaya need cheap textiles. But the process of normal exchange is upset when the British Government, quite naturally concerned by the plight of the Lancashire textile industry, imposes a quota which sharply reduces Japanese sales of textiles in Malaya.

The remarkable growth of the paper and rayon industries is making heavy inroads on Japan’s reserves of timber. A time may come in the not very distant future when timber imports from Eastern Siberia will be desired. But the Soviet Union, with its tightly closed economic system and its state monopoly of foreign trade, will quite possibly refuse to sell this timber to Japan, if it wishes to payoff some political grudges, or may refuse to accept the exports which Japan can offer in exchange.

Of course it is theoretically possible for Japan to pay for Malayan rubber, or Siberian timber, or any other commodity which it may need, out of the receipts of its sales in other markets. But with trade restrictions established and multiplying all over the world, it is not easy to convince the Japanese that physical possession of essential raw materials is a matter of indifference. There is a strong temptation to cast the samurai sword into the mercantile scales that seem unfairly weighted against Japan.

The restless Japanese feeling of a need for expansion, for outlets, is intensified by the necessity of providing work and food for the half million people of working age who come on the labor market every year. Among the larger countries of the world Japan is second only to the Soviet Union in the rate of growth of its population. Between 1930 and 1935 the number of inhabitants of Japan proper (Japan proper consists of the four islands, Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido, with a number of smaller islands scattered along their coasts. The Japanese Empire also includes Formosa, Korea, and Southern Sakhalin. The population of the empire is approximately 97,000,000.) increased from 64,450,005 to 69,254,148. Births exceeded deaths in 1935 by more than 1,000,000.

With an area slightly less than that of California, Japan proper must support about twelve times the population of California. Japan’s problem is made more difficult by the mountainous character of the country. Only 15.6 per cent of the area of Japan proper is rated as arable land. While the density of population in relation to total area is greater in Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, density in relation to arable land works out much less favorably to Japan, as the percentage of cultivated area is 43.7 in Germany, 40.2 in Belgium, 24.2 in Great Britain, and 27.8 in the Netherlands.

Japan may be regarded, along with Germany and Italy, as one of the three major dissatisfied “have-not” powers of the world. It was in Italian Fascist intellectual circles that the idea first found expression that there could just as logically be a “class struggle” between rich and poor nations as between the “bourgeoisie” and the “proletariat” in a single nation. German National Socialist leaders have displayed an increasing tendency to attribute their country’s economic difficulties largely to the lack of colonial sources of essential raw materials. Japan sees itself confronted with a similar problem, despite the acquisition of Manchoukuo. So the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Amau, recently remarked:-

Unfortunately the territories which now feed Japan’s population are too small. Weare advised to practice birth control, but this advice comes too late, since the population of the Japanese Empire is already about 1 00,000,000. Japanese work harder and longer than people in Western countries; their opportunities in life are more restricted. Why? We need more territory and must cultivate more resources if we are to nourish our population.

A succinct statement of Japan’s case as a “have-not” power is to be found in the following excerpt from a widely read Japanese economic textbook, which has been translated into English under the title Nippon: A Charted Survey:-

The territory of Japan represents one half per cent of the world’s total, while her population makes up five per cent of the world’s total. In other words, Japan’s population density is approximately ten times greater than the average population density of the world. Moreover, Japan is for the most part mountainous, favored with comparatively few stretches of open level land. Dearth of sown acreage and overpopulation are two distinct fundamental factors of Japan’s national life. It will be no exaggeration to say that this particular condition of the country underlies all the difficulties which its people find in their way.

The belief that overpopulation (in relation to available natural resources) is the root cause of Japan’s difficulties runs like a red thread through almost all Japanese publications on social and economic subjects. Even liberal and radical professors and publicists who are outspokenly or cautiously critical of the high-handed methods of the country’s military leaders are quick to point out that the world-wide restrictions on Japanese immigrants and Japanese goods greatly accentuate the strains within the Japanese social order and play into the hands of the advocates of violent courses.

There is abundant statistical proof that Japan’s position is that of a proletarian nation. It depends entirely, or almost entirely, on foreign sources for such vitally necessary raw materials as cotton, wool, rubber, and oil, which are the lifeblood of some of its most important industries. There is no mineral of any consequence which Japan possesses in surplus quantities; and there is an absolute lack or a grave deficiency of such valuable industrial ores as iron, lead, zinc, and nickel. Its consistent bad fortune in finding natural resources within its own frontiers is exemplified in the northern island of Sakhalin, which is divided between Japan and the Soviet Union. Diligent prospecting has revealed no oil in the southern Japanese part of the island, while there is an abundant supply of this liquid fuel on the Russian side of the border.

Soon after my arrival in Japan I had an interesting talk with a professor in one of the leading Tokyo universities.

He remarked that, as the people of North China are of the same racial stock as the majority of the inhabitants of Manchoukuo, it would only be natural if, in time, these two territories should come under the same sovereignty.

Then, he suggested, would come the turn of vast, sparsely populated Outer Mongolia. Finally, the Japanese Empire might be rounded out by the addition of the maritime provinces of Siberia. After outlining this substantial programme of national aggrandizement, the professor, with a very amiable smile, concluded:

“Some people say I am an imperialist. But I think I am only a sane liberal.”

The professor, of course, was a private individual, with no official responsibilities. But similar expansionist voices are not infrequently raised in the Japanese newspaper and periodical press. So Mr. Chonosuke Yada, director of the Japan-Siam Society, offered the following suggestions in regard to Japanese southward expansion in the course of a recent lecture:

The world situation is constantly changing. It is highly questionable how long the Netherlands can retain her territories in the East Indies, which are more than sixty times as large as her homeland, and continue to exploit them to her advantage. It is also uncertain how long India will remain a British possession. When we take account of these facts we are convinced that Japan must make her way southward. She must make her way southward immediately, for there is no time to be lost.

Other suggestions for a peaceful enlargement of Japan’s possessions were the intimation by Foreign Minister Hirota, in the spring of 1935, that Japan would be glad to consider purchasing the Soviet northern part of the island of Sakhalin and the more recent proposal in the Japanese Diet that Japan should lease the huge, undeveloped Dutch portion of the island of New Guinea. The Soviet reaction to Hirota’s suggestion was freezingly negative, and it is doubtful whether the Dutch Government would ever, except under duress, open up any part of its East Indian possessions to large-scale Japanese colonization and economic development. The fear is too great that any such concession would be only the prelude to the bringing of the whole rich East Indian archipelago under the Rising Sun flag.

Behind Japan’s urge to expansion are a number of impelling forces. There is the explosive pressure of rapidly increasing population in a land that is already overcrowded. There is the feeling of being unfairly treated in the world distribution of territory and raw materials. There is the exceptionally strong position of the fighting services vis-à-vis the civil authorities. There is the high-flown sense of nationalism, which for many Japanese has all the force of religious conviction. There is the mystical idea of Japan’s Pan-Asian mission, very popular with retired army officers and nationalist theoreticians, which envisage Japan as the leader of an Asia from which “white imperialism” has been banished. Finally, there is the great difficulty, not to say impossibility, of turning back from the imperial road on which the country has started, no matter how great may be the difficulties and obstacles which may be encountered.

This last consideration may be clarified through an illustration. If Japan had not seized Manchuria, the Soviet Union might not have considered it necessary to send a powerful army, with a large complement of tanks and airplanes, to the Far East and to create a flotilla of submarines in Far Eastern waters. But now that the Soviet troops and airplanes and tanks and submarines are there, the Japanese military leaders feel that it is an elementary requirement of national security to scale up their own military and air forces to meet the threat. This is only one of several instances in which the costs of imperialism grow because of the opposition and counter-pressure which it excites.

If one may paraphrase a famous saying of Karl Marx; “a spectre is haunting East Asia: the spectre of Japan.” From icy Komsomolsk, eastern terminus of Russia’s new strategic railway in Eastern Siberia, to humidly tropical Singapore, where Great Britain has built up a Far Eastern Gibraltar in the shape of a powerful naval and air base, on what was formerly a jungle swamp, Japan is the primary object of political, military, and naval apprehensions and calculations.

Japan’s drive for expansion on the Asiatic mainland began when a mysterious bomb exploded on the line of the South Manchuria Railway outside of Mukden on the night of September 18, 1931. The bomb did very little damage, but its reverberations were heard around the world. For, using this incident as a pretext, the Japanese Army, flouting the feeble remonstrance’s of civilian officials at home and the equally impotent protests of the League of Nations, carried out a complete occupation of Manchuria. This brought under Japan’s effective control an area more than three times as great as that of Japan proper and thrust forward the military frontier to the Soviet boundary on the Amur River.

Since that time incidents of forward movement have alternated with periods of relative calm. But the drive shows no signs of coming to a definite end, even though it may slacken in momentum from time to time in response to a stiffening of actual or potential obstacles. It would be a bold observer who would venture to predict how the Japanese Empire may appear on a map published in 1945 or 1950.

Every recent year has had its milestone on Japan’s road to empire. In 1933 it was the slicing off of Jehol, with its old Chinese imperial palaces, its coal, and its strategic mountain passes, from the main body of China and its incorporation in Manchoukuo. In 1934 there was the Amau Statement, with its warning that Japan was assuming a veto power in regard to foreign “political” loans to China.

The year 1935 witnessed the elimination of the last vestige of the traditional Russian influence in North Manchuria through the transfer by purchase of the Soviet share of ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchoukuo. It was also marked by a series of maneuvers, on the part of the Japanese military authorities in China, calculated to undermine the authority of the central government at Nanking over the seventy-five million inhabitants of the five provinces of North China. The culmination of these maneuvers was the setting up, with very obvious Japanese military connivance and sympathy, of a puppet regime headed by Yin Ju-keng in the eastern districts of North China.

Early in 1936 irregular forces, emerging from Manchoukuo drove out the Chinese troops and militia and established a pro-Japanese regime in the large, sparsely populated province of Chahar, which is believed to be rich in undeveloped iron resources. Mr. Koki Hirota, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, put forward three points as essential prerequisites of Sino-Japanese understanding. These points were cooperation between China and Japan in suppressing Communism; recognition of Manchoukuo by China, and the cessation by China of all unfriendly actions in relation to Japan and of the policy of “playing off a third power against Japan.” The first and third of these points were capable of elastic interpretation; they might be stretched to the point of asserting for Japan the right to supervise China’s foreign relations and to send Japanese troops into any part of China where Communist forces might be operating.

Two other important events in the establishment of an informal Japanese hegemony in North China were the substantial increase of the Japanese garrison in the Peiping Tientsin area and the inflow of smuggled goods, largely of Japanese origin, as a result of the paralysis of the authority of the Chinese customs inspectors and the free hand which was given to Japanese and Korean smugglers.

The further forward step which was so clearly foreshadowed by the previous process of wedge like penetration of North China occurred in the summer of 1937. A nocturnal clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at Lukowkiao, near Peiping, was followed by several other conflicts, in which each side accused the other of being the aggressor. The Japanese Government rushed in additional troops; and on July 28 and 29 large-scale military operations, accompanied by an extensive use of air bombing, drove the ill-equipped local Chinese troops from Peiping and Tientsin. While the situation is still fluid at the moment of writing, all the omens seem to point to the setting up in the Peiping-Tientsin area of a regime that will be thoroughly compliant with Japanese demands.

Quite in line with the policy of expansion on land was the denunciation by the Japanese Government of the Washington Naval Treaty and the refusal to conclude any new naval agreement except on a basis of parity with the United States and Great Britain. The 5-5-3 ratio which had been considered adequate for Japan’s security in 1922 was regarded as no longer satisfactory by the growing Empire of 1936.

Anyone who has been attending the press conferences at the Tokyo Ministry of Foreign Affairs and who has been in contact with representative Japanese officials and publicists could not fail to notice the intense unwillingness to assume any restraining obligations regarding future Japanese actions, especially in China. Japan has withdrawn from the League of Nations, and the Japanese press makes no secret of its belief that the Nine-Power Treaty concluded at Washington, which stipulates “respect for the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China,” and provides for communication between the nine powers with major interests in the Pacific in the event of any situation which may involve the application of this treaty, is a dead letter.

Questioned on one occasion as to the Japanese attitude in the event that the Nine-Power Treaty should be invoked in connection with some disputed point between Japan and China, Mr. Eiji Amau, the well-known spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, significantly replied: “The world is moving and the treaties are standing still.” He added that China, anyway, had never carried out its obligations under that treaty.

Japan’s advance in Asia has been one of the major developments of the present decade. It has greatly affected not only the international relations but also the internal politics and economics of what can no longer be called with strict accuracy the Island Empire.

Japan’s foreign and domestic policies have been inseparably connected since the occupation of Manchuria, and no account of one would be complete or even intelligible without constant reference to the other. This consideration has helped to shape the scheme of the present book. While the first half deals with Japan’s adventures abroad and with their present and probable future consequences, the concluding chapters endeavor to give an outline sketch of Japan at home, and especially of those tendencies which have been most marked during the last few years.

My purpose has been to write neither an indictment nor a vindication of Japan’s expansionism, but to set forth as objectively as possible the main events and causes of the forward drive in Asia, the obstacles which it has encountered, and the favorable and unfavorable auguries for Japan’s imperial career in the future.

At the moment of writing (September 1), the ultimate scope of the Japanese military action in North China which began in July 1937 is still uncertain. So far as it has gone, however, this action, which brought to a violent close a period of deadlock: and uncertainty in the Peiping- Tientsin area, confirms the thesis of this book: that Japan, ever since the occupation of Manchuria in 1931, has experienced an overmastering urge to expansion on the Asiatic mainland. There have been setbacks and periods of lull; but the process has never stopped or been stabilized. Except in the unlikely event of a Japanese military defeat, the probable outcome of the present conflict would seem to be the extension of effective Japanese control (most probably through the well-tried method of puppet Chinese administrative units) over a considerable part of China north of the Yellow River.

For more than two years I have been stationed in Tokyo as Chief Far Eastern Correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor. In this capacity I have traveled extensively in China, Manchoukuo, the Philippines, and other countries of East Asia, besides visiting almost every part of the Japanese Empire. I am grateful to the Editorial Board of the Christian Science Monitor for their kind permission to incorporate in the book some material which I have published in the Monitor. A similar acknowledgment is due to the editors of Asia, the Yale Review, Foreign Affairs, and Current History for authorization to make use of excerpts from articles which I have contributed to these publications.

William Henry Chamberlin

Shintoism is one of Japan’s largest religions. It also holds the distinction of being the native religion of the land. Having originated in Japan and being almost exclusive to the country, Shintoism is believed to date back to the prehistoric times as a religion which preached paying respect to nature and in particular certain sacred sites. These sites were probably used to worship the Sun, rock formations, trees, and even sounds. Since the people of Japan used to associate a deity with each of these things, this led to a complex polytheistic religion. The deities in Shintoism are known as Kami-sama. Shinto itself means ‘The way of the Kami’. The forms of worship celebration in Shinto are all meant to express gratitude to the Kami for what has been, and to secure their continued good favor in the future.

After the sixth century, Shinto gradually became a religion of shrines, with set festivals and rituals, overseen by a separate priestly class. Many festivals are large community celebrations for particular parts of the year such as spring planting, fall harvest, or other special events in the history of a location or shrine. Other celebrations are performed for similar purposes on a smaller scale at home or in a neighborhood shrine.

Cleanliness is a major emphasis in the Shinto festival. Ritual washing, neatness and order, and personal sincerity are all ways in which cleanliness is emphasized. Since the earliest days, Shinto has been the source of a code of honor and action for the Japanese people. This code stresses a gratitude and respect for living things, deep appreciation for natural beauty, and a preference for the simple and unadorned. Thus the lines of a raked stone garden both symbolize and become the ripples of water surrounding the large upright stone(s) in the gardens’ center. Out of respect for the lines in the garden, one treats other human beings with the greatest of respect, not knowing where the ripple effect of one’s action may encounter another human being. The tranquility of this harmony between the human, natural, and divine elements is the source and goal of Shinto celebration.

Worship of Shinto is done at shrines. It is an indigenous religion and has no holy book, no founder, and no canon. There are three essential elements in any form of Shinto worship. The first step is the all-important act of purification, a ritual washing involving water. The second step is an offering to the Kami, which is usually food or money. The third step is offering a prayer to the Kami, of both thanksgiving and petition for the future. Music, dance, and ritual reenactment of planting, harvest, or history are often involved in the large community celebrations. The Shinto celebrations bring the Kami into the presence of the daily life of the community.

Shinto began to fall out of fashion after the arrival of Buddhism, but soon, Shinto and Buddhism began to be practiced as one religion. On sites of Shinto shrines, Buddhist temples were built, and people began to adhere to both. Today, most Japanese adhere to Shrine Shinto, and also to Buddhism.

Welcome to one of the most exciting cities of the world – Tokyo. One of the world’s major global cities and a bona fide mega city, Tokyo is the seat of the Japanese government and the Imperial Palace, which is the home of the Japanese Imperial Family. It is also the capital of Japan.

Tokyo (Tokyo Metropolis) as an administrative region is one of 47 prefectures of Japan and is not administered as a single city. It consists of twenty-three central “special wards” and many suburban cities.

About 12 million people – 10% of the population of Japan live in Tokyo, while approximately 33 to 35 million people live in the entire Greater Tokyo conurbation, making it effectively part of the most populated urban area on the face of the planet. Many also feel that Tokyo is the costliest city in the world, and also has the most congested streets.

Tokyo holds many attractions for tourists. Getting to see every attraction would take weeks. Thanks to a very convenient train and subway transport system (with signs in English), it is easy to visit most of these attractions if you plan in advance.

Japan is a land of many shrines and temples scattered throughout the land. Of these, the Imperial Palace (Kokyo), the Meiji Shrine, and the Sensoji Temple are the three most popular ones in Tokyo. Kokyo is the home of the Emperor and Crown Prince and their families. The Meiji Shrine is dedicated to Emperor Meiji, and hence the name.

Tokyo also holds many festivals, large and small, throughout the year. Of these, some of the most popular ones include the Shishi Matsuri (lion dance festival), held in Spring (March-May), the Tokyo Bay Fireworks in Summer, the Tokyo Jidai Matsuri during Fall and the Hatsumode New Year’s Prayers at Meiji Shrine, Sensoji, and other major shrines and temples in Winter.

Tokyo also offers an array of locations famed for their scenic beauty, such as the magnificent Tokyo Tower, the grand Tokyo Metropolitan Government Building Observatory, the unforgettable Rainbow Bridge walkway, the Sunshine City Observatory in Ikebukuro, and the Fuji TV Headquarters Observatory in Odaiba. Should you feel like taking a stroll in a park, choose from the many beautiful and immaculately maintained parks found in Tokyo. These include the Hibiya Park, the Jingu Gaien, the beautiful East Garden of the Imperial Palace, the Meiji Shrine Inner Garden, the Sumida Park and plenty more.

And who can escape without doing a little shopping while in Tokyo? Tokyo has various shopping districts famous for specific products. For example, Akihabara is well-known for its dazzling electronics stores, Shinjuku for cameras and books, Ginza for department stores and luxury goods, Shibuya and Harajuku for teenage fashion, and Jinbocho for used (and new) books.

Take time to explore the fascinating city of Tokyo. One trip may not be enough to experience everything that this great city has to offer. But whatever you gather will make for memories of a lifetime.

There are a good many reasons for calling Japan the ‘Land of the rising Sun’. One that is quite logical concerns its location on our planet that is easternmost. Since the sun rises in the east, its rays perceptibly reach Japan first and so the saying is justified. Another version relates to the ancient Japanese who believed that there was no landmass existing in the world, east of their country and hence called their land ‘Nippon’ or land of the rising Sun. No matter whether the Sun is partial to the Japanese or not, people living in the land of the rising Sun are adept in rising to any occasion whenever the situation so demands.

Japan consists of four major islands – Hokkaido in the north, Kyushu in the south, Honshu and Shikoku. Of these, Honshu is the largest. Although the total land area in Japan is around 378,000 sq km, only 16% of it is habitable and/or arable, since the rest is mountainous and inhospitable. The obvious result is the immense density of population. Also, Japan is located on the Pacific Ring of Fire, meaning the country is prone to earthquakes. Japan experiences around 1500 seismic occurrences every year. So, the housing and construction schemes in Japan are more restricted as compared to other countries.

Unlike other Asian countries, the climatic condition in Japan varies much. While Hokkaido in the north experiences freezing cold, Okinawa in the south has tropical climate. Japan is affected by Typhoons during September, but the hazards are mostly limited to the southern islands.

Being one of the leading industrial superpowers having teams of skilled workforce with strong work ethics, Japan has advanced on various industrial fields, surpassing many. Innovative thought process and technical advancement of the Japanese have helped them achieve topmost niches in several industrial fields where others had not been so successful. Japanese car- makers had almost beaten hollow most of the big American manufacturers with the introduction of front wheel drive cars in the USA that never skid or slip on a road surface that is covered in ice. Being a pioneer in the field of cellular phone manufacturing, Japan today is probably the largest supplier of mobile phones in the world. In electronics and allied trade, companies like Sony, Nokia and Mitshubishi have reached legendary dimensions. Roboting technology is currently sweeping Japan to such an extent that all hazardous jobs in the not too distant future are likely to be taken over by robots, replacing the human agency altogether.

People from the land of the rising Sun have also made ample contributions to the cause of art, literature, cinema and music. Great Japanese filmmakers like Kinji Fakasaku, Elji Okuda and Yasijiro Ozu have made award winning movies that have gained worldwide applause.

According to eco gurus, however, Japanese economy that represents almost 15% of the world economy may suffer a lot in the foreseeable future since the scenario is undergoing fast change with China and India hitting hard on the world market. With globalization working in full swing, electronic goods made in China are fast replacing Japanese products for their cheaper price and easier availability. Is this an indication that the Sun is on the point of setting in the land of the rising Sun in the near future? But never rule out Japan, remember, they rose like the Phoenix since the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.